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Abstract
Global imbalances are considered as one of the main culprits of the financial
crisis which started in the United States in 2007. This paper aims to build a two-
country deterministic growth framework with overlapping generations to investigate
the macroeconomic effects of global imbalances that originate from forced saving in
one country. This framework allows us to study the existence of a dynamic equi-
librium with global imbalances, the impact on the world interest rate, and the
short-run and long-run welfare implications on the young and old generations in
both countries. In particular, we show that global imbalances worsen the welfare of
the young generations of both countries in the short run and can offset the potential
gain of the international integration of capital markets.
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1 Introduction
Among the root causes of the financial crisis which started in the United States in 2007,
some point to the persistence of large global imbalances for a decade before the meltdown
(Figure 1).1 By global imbalances it is meant that the fast-growing emerging economies
and the developing countries finance the current account deficits of the slow-growing ad-
vanced economies.2 This is an anomaly. Countries with a young population and high
economic growth rates, as is the case with emerging economies, are expected to experi-
ence current account deficits that can be financed by foreign saving seeking high-yield
investments. Advanced economies with ageing populations and low growth prospects are
expected to save more and, hence, experience current account surpluses. Saving is thus
allocated where it is most productive and imbalances in current accounts reduce as di-
minishing returns on capital curb the growth rates of emerging economies over time. This
international self-equilibrium mechanism is ineffective when the advanced economies rely
on the saving of the export-led developing world to finance their growth and their external
deficits, as has been the case since 1996.3 This phenomenon is a new and serious challenge
for the stability of the world economy. The integration of the countries of the former So-
viet Bloc into the world goods and capital markets and the international integration of
capital markets in the last twenty years have created a huge and a truly global capital
market. In this international capital market, global imbalances such as those observed
since 1996 can now occur, and there is no market mechanism to wipe them out over time.
Some have expressed concern regarding the systemic risks these global imbalances could
create for the world economy (IMF (2005), Krugman (2007) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2007)). Bernanke (2005, 2007) expresses greater confidence regarding the ability of the
market to gradually resolve the external imbalances.
The origins of these global imbalances are also debated. Bernanke (2005) challenged the
common view that was held at the time that the large U.S. current account deficit was
due to the U.S. economic policies responsible for the low domestic saving and the frenzied
consumption of foreign goods. He argued that the reversal in the current account positions
of the emerging economies in the second half of the 1990s created a “global saving glut”
allowing the cheap financing of the U.S. current account deficit and accounting for both
1This question is controversial. For instance, Bernanke (2009), BIS (2009), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009)
and Portes (2009) argue that the global imbalances are one of the causes or are a co-determinant of the
financial crisis. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) think that the failures of the financial system are
the trigger for the financial crisis and contributed to the widening of global imbalances. Laibson and
Mollerstrom (2010) and Whelan (2010) challenge the link between global imbalances and the financial
crisis.
2This definition is somewhat restrictive as global imbalances could result from the current account
deficits and surpluses of any groups of countries, reflecting the disparities in economic and demographic
trends. However, the term ”global imbalances” has been used in the literature to characterize precisely
the situation described by this definition.
3Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) show that the ratio of the absolute value of the world current
account balances to the world GDP was stable from 1970 to 1996 and started to increase sharply from
then on.
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the widening of global imbalances and the low level of real interest rates. Bernanke puts
forward several reasons to explain this reversal. First, many developing and emerging
economies modified their economic policies after the series of financial crises in the 1990s
so as to yield current account surpluses and build foreign exchange reserves in order
to reduce the financial liquidity risk in case of a sudden change in foreign investors’
behaviour (“disruptive adjustment”). Second, other countries, such as China, maintained
their export-led growth policy by preventing their currency from appreciating. Third,
the rise in oil prices during the last decade inflated the income of oil-exporting countries
and, hence, increased their level of saving. Finally, the deep and liquid U.S. financial
markets provided a highly attractive heaven for this foreign saving glut. All these factors
contributed to increasing saving in developing countries and enabling the U.S. and other
industrial countries to afford to live on credit. In order to account for global imbalances,
Caballero et al (2008) add to Bernanke’s hypothesis the underdevelopment of financial
markets in emerging countries. In their model, increasing saving in emerging countries
does not find sufficient sound local stores of value and, therefore, a rising proportion
of saving flows to the perceived better U.S. financial markets. Thus, the widening of
the U.S. current account deficit, the decline in world interest rates and the increase in
U.S. assets within global portfolios are not an anomaly but rather a global equilibrium
resulting from the capital flows in asset markets. The “global saving glut” hypothesis has
nevertheless been questioned by a number of authors stressing the fact that there has been
little evidence of excess supply at the world level (IMF 2005). Laibson and Mollerstrom
(2010) further argue that the inflows of foreign capital into the U.S. due to the saving
glut should have increased the U.S. investment rate, but this is not reflected in the U.S.
data. Calibrating a behavioural model with an exogenous asset bubble for the U.S., the
authors show that the rise in asset and real estate prices creates a perceived wealth effect
for consumers, leading to a consumption boom and an associated decrease in the saving
rate. Consistent with the U.S. data, their model shows that investment is not affected,
saving is lower, and therefore, the U.S. current account deficit increases. Based on a
dataset of 43 countries between 1990 and 2005, Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) confirm
the positive relationship between current account balances and real estate valuation across
countries. Taylor (2009) lies in between these two stances. He does not dispute the fact
that there was a saving glut outside the advanced economies, which is consistent with
the widening of global imbalances. However, as the data show that this saving glut was
not big enough to create an excess supply of saving at the world level, he argues that the
observed low level of real interest rates could not be a consequence of the rise in saving in
emerging economies but rather the result of the Federal Reserve’s policy. By maintaining
the federal funds rate below the Taylor rule for too long, this policy combined with U.S.
government interventions in the real estate market contributed significantly to the sheer
size of the real estate bubble, accounting for both the consumption boom and the current
account deficit in the U.S. Although Bernanke (2005) concludes that the world outside
the U.S. is responsible for global imbalances and Taylor (2009) blames U.S. policies, we
think that these two views are not mutually exclusive and even reinforce each other. This
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Figure 1: Current account balance in billions U.S. dollars (1990-2015)
in saving in the developing countries. This increase is the result of government policy in
these countries, either because they pursue an export-led growth strategy or because they
do not want to be dependent on foreign saving. In both cases, government intervention
leads to forced saving. Our main objective is to build a growth framework flexible enough
to study different issues associated with the possibility that capital flows from fast-growing
to slow-growing economies. The model extends Buiter (1981) by considering a two-country
overlapping generations (OLG) model with forced saving – represented by an exogenous
increase in the preference parameter – in the fast-growing country. A series of propositions
are derived such as the existence of a dynamic equilibrium with global imbalances, the
impact on the world interest rate, and the short-run and long-run welfare implications on
the young and old generations in both countries. In particular, we want to analyse the
combination of the effect of the international integration of capital markets studied by
Buiter (1981) and the effect of global imbalances. We demonstrate that global imbalances
worsen the welfare of the young generations of both countries in the short run and can
offset the potential gain of the international integration of capital markets.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the two-country overlapping gen-
erations model and presents the dynamic equilibrium in autarky and in open economy.
Section 3 analyses the steady-state current account balances when tastes and population
growth rates differ across countries. Section 4 introduces global imbalances in the two-
country model, and studies the existence of an intertemporal equilibrium and the impact
on the world interest rate and transition growth. Section 5 presents the implications of
global imbalances on the short-run and long-run welfare of the young and old generations
in both countries. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 A Two-Country Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a discrete-time deterministic model of an economy consisting of two coun-
tries, A and B, producing the same good under perfect competition from date t = 0 to
infinity. The model builds on Diamond (1965). Each country is populated by overlapping
generations living for two periods. When young, individuals supply inelastically one unit
of labour to the firms, receive a wage and allocate this income between consumption and
saving. When old, they retire and consume the return on their saving. The labour market
is perfectly competitive within the national borders while physical capital moves freely
across countries. The representative firm in each country produces a single aggregate





i,t , i = A,B, (1)
where Ki,t is the stock of capital, Li,t is the labour input, and Ai is a technological
parameter of country i at time t. We assume that physical capital fully depreciates after
one period. At time t, the representative firm of country i has an installed stock of capital
Ki,t, chooses the labour input paid at the competitive wage wi,t, equal to the marginal
product of labour, and maximizes its profits
pii,t = Aik
α
i,t − wi,t, (2)
where pii,t = Ri,tki,t are the profits per worker distributed to the owners of the capital stock,
the interest factor Ri,t is equal to the marginal product of capital, and ki,t ≡ Ki,t/Li,t is
the capital-labour ratio.
The representative agent of country i maximizes a logarithmic additively separable utility
function
Ui = ln ci,t + βi ln di,t+1 (3)
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subject to the budget constraints
ci,t + si,t = wi,t (4)
di,t+1 = Ri,t+1si,t, (5)
where ci,t is consumption when young and si,t is individual saving at time t. When old, the
individuals consume di,t+1. The parameter βi > 0 is the psychological discount factor in
country i. We assume that this parameter may have different values across countries. The








Individual saving depends only on the marginal product of labour and the preference
parameter βi. The lower βi, ceteris paribus, the higher the preference for the present and
the lower the level of saving.
2.2 The Autarkic Equilibrium
If capital is not mobile across countries, the two-country growth model is equivalent to the
autarkic model. The equilibrium in the national labour market is given by the equality
between the national supply and demand for labour. Since the labour supply is inelastic
and the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, the national equilibrium
wage is equal to the marginal product of labour. The equilibrium in the goods market in
country i at time t is given by the national income accounts identity:
Yi,t = Li,tci,t + Li,t−1di,t + Ii,t, i = A,B (7)
The aggregate output is equal to total consumption at time t in country i. Full depre-
ciation of the current capital stock implies Ii,t = Ki,t+1. The equilibrium in the national
capital market is given by the equality between national investment and saving:
Ki,t+1 = Li,tsi,t. (8)
The capital stock per worker in country i accumulates according to












is the population growth rate of country i. The autarkic equilib-









The level of the steady state capital stock per worker of country i increases with the
psychological discount factor βi and with the level of the technological parameter Ai, and
decreases when the population growth rate increases. Each country converges to its own
steady state income per capita, which is entirely determined by national parameters. The









This growth rate is a positive function of βi and Ai, and a negative function of ki,t and
ni. At the steady state, the growth rate of the capital stock per worker is zero.
2.3 The Open-Economy Equilibrium
Capital is now allowed to move from one country to another in a frictionless international
capital market. The equilibrium in the labour market is the same as in the autarkic
equilibrium, since labour is immobile across countries. The equilibrium in the world
goods market at period t is given by the world income accounts identity:
YA,t + YB,t = LA,tcA,t + LA,t−1dA,t + LB,tcB,t + LB,t−1dB,t + IA,t + IB,t, (12)
where the world output is equal to the aggregate consumption of the young and the
old generations and the aggregate investment in both countries. Full depreciation of the
current capital stock in each country implies IA,t = KA,t+1 and IB,t = KB,t+1.
It is assumed that the owners of the capital stock at date t = 0 in both countries cannot
move this stock from one country to the other. The integration of capital markets thus
occurs at date t = 1. The equilibrium in the international capital market, once capital is
mobile across countries, derives from (12) and yields:
KA,t+1 +KB,t+1 = LA,tsA,t + LB,tsB,t. (13)
The perfect mobility on the international capital market makes domestic and foreign
assets perfect substitutes. At the world level, total investment must equal total saving.












By using Equations (6), (13) and (14), we can compute the intertemporal equilibrium






























































































The level of k¯i increases with an increase in the psychological discount factor of both
countries and the level of the domestic technological parameter, and decreases with an
increase in the growth rate of the population of both countries and the level of the foreign
technological parameter. At the steady state, the capital stock per worker and hence the
income per capita remains constant. The transition dynamics in the two countries are












































The capital stock per worker in both countries at time t+ 1 is a positive function of kA,t
and kB,t. At the steady state, the growth rate of the capital stock per worker is zero in
both countries.
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3 The Balance of Payments
In an open two-country world, a country can finance domestic investment by foreign
saving. The difference between domestic investment and domestic saving is equal to
the current account balance. In other words, a country can spend more or less than it
produces. The national income accounts identity of country i in this two-country economy
is
Yi,t +Rt(Li,t−1si,t−1 −Ki,t) = Li,tci,t + Li,t−1di,t +Ki,t+1 +Gi,t, (21)
where Yi,t and Rt(Li,tsi,t − Ki,t+1) are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the net
factor income from abroad respectively, and the sum of the two is the Gross National
Income (GNI) of country i at time t. On the right hand side of the identity, Gi,t is the
difference between domestic spending on foreign capital and foreign spending on domestic
capital. In this model of one single good, where there is no trade in consumption goods
and there are no unilateral transfers, Gi,t is the current account balance of country i at
time t. This is simply the difference between the factor income from abroad and the factor
income payments to the foreign country. In intensive form, taking into account the fact
that yi,t = wi,t +Rtki,t, the current account balance is equal to
gi,t = wi,t +
Li,t−1
Li,t







or, equivalently, since di,t = Rtsi,t−1,




Without loss of generality, we focus on country A. The conditions on the current account
balance per worker are as follows:
















The current account balance of country A is an increasing function of kA,t, βA, and the
population growth rate of country B, and a decreasing function of kB,t, βB and the
population growth rate of country A. When capital is free to move from one country to
another,

















Condition (25) is also the condition for gA S 0 at the steady state. We now establish the
following two propositions:
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Proposition 1 Buiter (1981) In a two-country model with overlapping generations living
for two periods, a country i experiences a current account deficit (surplus) at the steady
state if, for identical population growth rates across countries, the preference parameter
βi is lower (higher) than that of the foreign country.









and the growth rates of population are identical.
Under autarky, the level of the steady-state capital stock per worker is an increasing
function of β, the psychological discount factor (see Equation (10)). Assuming that two
countries are identical in all respects except in the preference parameter β, a country
populated with more impatient consumers (lower β) will have a lower k¯ and a higher
steady-state capital return than the country populated with more patient consumers. If
capital markets are integrated, the country with impatient consumers will attract foreign
investment owing to a higher capital return up to the point where capital returns are
equal. Therefore, this country will have a current account deficit at the steady state.
Proposition 2 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-
riods, a country i experiences a current account deficit (surplus) at the steady state if,
for identical tastes across countries, the growth rate of country i’s population is higher
(lower) than that of the foreign country.









and βA = βB.
Under autarky, the level of the steady-state capital stock per worker is a decreasing
function of the population growth rate (see Equation (10)). Assuming that two countries
are identical in all respects except in their demographic patterns, a country with a fast-
growing population will have a lower k¯ and a higher steady-state capital return than the
country with a slow-growing population. If capital markets are integrated, the country
with the higher capital return will attract foreign investment up to the point where capital
returns are equal. Therefore, the country with the fast-growing population will record a
current account deficit at the steady state.4
Let us now consider that one country, say country A, has a higher value for the preference
parameter than country B but has a higher population growth rate. If country A has a
4Empirical studies find that countries with low dependency ratios tend to experience current account
surpluses and countries with high fertility rates and young populations tend to experience current account
deficits (Higgins (1998) and IMF (2004) for instance).
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sufficiently higher population growth rate, this country will have a current deficit at the
steady state. Hence, the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods, a country, say country A, experiences a current account deficit at the steady state if,







Proof: Again, this results derives easily from condition (25).
This proposition stresses the fact that, even in a country with thrifty consumers, the level
of the preference parameter may not be sufficiently high to compensate for the negative
effect of a higher population growth rate on its current account. The higher the differential
in population growth rates across countries, the higher the differential in the preference
parameters must be.
4 A Two-Country Model with Global Imbalances
In this section, we consider a two-country world in which country A is a developing
economy and country B is an advanced economy. The development gap is captured by
the technological parameter and the initial capital stocks per worker: AA < AB and
kA,0 < kB,0. We will also assume that the government of country A intervenes whenever
the market outcome yields a current account deficit. Its intervention is represented by a
constraint in the consumer’s optimization programme and is evidenced by a change in the
value of the parameter βA so as to generate a current account balance positive or null. The
government’s policy can thus be interpreted as forced saving. This section is organized
as follows. First, we define an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances. Second,
the conditions for country A’s government intervention are established. Third, we study
the existence of an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances. Fourth, we examine
the real interest rate when there are global imbalances. Finally, we verify whether the
equilibrium result with government intervention improves or worsens the welfare of the
young and the old generations.
4.1 Intertemporal Equilibrium with Global Imbalances: Defini-
tion
Given AA < AB or/and kA,0 < kB,0, an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances
is a sequence of temporary equilibria that satisfies gA,t > 0 for all t > 0.
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Table 1: Current account potential trajectories and conditions for country A
gA,0 gA,1 gA,2 . . . gA,∞ Condition
























































































































































































































































































4.2 Country A’s Government Intervention
From Equations (24) and (25), we can identify nine potential trajectories for gA, the cur-
rent account balance per worker in the developing economy. Assuming that international
capital integration is achieved at t = 1, Table 1 displays these nine potential trajectories
as well as the conditions under which they arise. By assumption, the government of coun-
try A intervenes whenever the current account balance is negative. Three cases (7, 8 and
9) are mainly of interest since the government of country A can intervene at the initial
date to avoid the current account deficit yielded by the market. In cases 7 and 8, the
government can intervene only at t = 0, since the current account balance is nonnegative
for t > 0. Cases 7 and 8 can thus be grouped together. In case 9, the government can
intervene at all times. Cases 3 and 6 can be omitted as they match case 9 when the
international integration of capital markets is achieved.
4.3 Existence of an Intertemporal Equilibrium with Global Im-
balances
After identifying the conditions under which the government of country A intervenes
to guarantee nonnegative current account balances, we can now address the question of
whether an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances exists. As already men-
tioned, we define an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances by a sequence of
temporary equilibria in which the current account balance of country A is never negative.
We study the existence condition and determine the policy response of the government to
ensure nonnegative current account balances. The model is identical to the one defined
in Section 2 with an integrated international capital market except for country A’s con-
sumer’s optimization programme of country A. In the present model, the representative
agent of country A maximizes a logarithmic additively separable utility function
UA = ln cA,t + βA ln dA,t+1 (27)
subject to the following three constraints
cA,t + sA,t = wA,t (28)
dA,t+1 = RA,t+1sA,t, (29)
gA,t > 0, (30)
where inequality (30) is the government’s constraint imposed on the consumers of country
A. If gA,t > 0 is verified at each period, then the decision to save by the individuals is
given by (6) and the government does not intervene. If gA,t < 0, the government acts
on βA to guarantee gA,t > 0. As a consequence, focusing on the three cases of interest
defined in Section 4.2, the government modifies βA at t = 0 only for cases 7 and 8 and at
each period for case 9.
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Proposition 4 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-



















Proof: gA,t > 0 for all t > 0 if condition (24) is verified. The necessary value for βA
derives from this condition.
If the expression in square brackets is positive, then the threshold given by condition (31)
increases with the increase in the population growth rate of country A. If condition (31)
is not satisfied by the preference parameter of country A’s representative consumer, then
country A’s government intervenes to impose a value for βA that satisfies this condition.
Proposition 4 establishes that, with a perfect integrated capital market, the global im-
balances are an equilibrium result when the fast-growing economy displays a sufficiently
higher propensity to save than the slow-growing economy. The larger the difference be-
tween the preference parameters across countries, the larger global imbalances. This
higher propensity to save in the fast-growing economy may result from the consumer
preferences or from forced saving imposed by government policies. In the former case,
the equilibrium is a pure market outcome. The lack of social insurance or the uneasy
access to credit can explain why the propensity to save is higher in emerging countries.
If this is caused by forced saving, global imbalances are the result of a government’s in-
tervention. Self-insurance against disruptive adjustments in the balance of payments is
generally put forward to account for such a public policy. Empirically, the IMF (2005)
study shows that the saving rate declined in advanced economies and increased in emerg-
ing and oil-producing economies at the end of the 1990s, yielding a reversal in current
account balances in emerging economies and leading to large global imbalances. This
reversal can be explained by government intervention in emerging economies after the
Asian financial crisis.
4.4 The Interest Rate
The (gross) interest rate Ri,t+1 is the rental rate of capital of country i at time t + 1.
When the capital markets are integrated, RA,t+1 = RB,t+1 = Rt+1. If βA does not satisfy
condition (31), the government intervenes, βA increases and the new interest rate is lower.
Proposition 5 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-
riods, the interest rate of the integrated capital market decreases, ceteris paribus, when
country A’s government intervenes to satisfy condition (31).
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Proof: If βA does not satisfy condition (31), the government intervenes, βA increases
and so does the capital stock per worker, kA,t+1. Therefore, due to the diminishing returns
to capital, the rental rate of capital of country A decreases. Country B’s capital becomes
more attractive and consumers of country A invest in country B up to the point where
the equality RA,t+1 = RB,t+1 is restored. In the end, the interest rate is lower than before
country A’s government intervention.
Real interest rates have gradually declined in the world over the last two decades to levels
not seen since the 1970s. A number of variables such as the weak labour force growth
in rich countries and demographic changes in the world can account for this evolution
Desroches and Francis (2010). However, the emergence of global imbalances at the end of
the 1990s likely contributed to maintaining world real interest rates at low levels Bernanke
(2005).
4.5 Transition Dynamics and Comparative Statics
If country A’s government has to intervene in period t to satisfy condition (31), this affects
either the growth rate or the steady state level of the capital stock per worker in both
countries.
Proposition 6 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-
riods, country A’s government intervention in period t to satisfy condition (31) implies,
ceteris paribus, a higher growth rate of the capital stock per capita in both countries if
the economies are on the transition path to the steady state. Otherwise, the intervention
results in a higher steady-state level of capital stock per worker if the economies have
reached their steady state in that period.
Proof: The transition dynamics in the two countries are governed by Equation (19) for
country A and Equation (20) for country B. It is straightforward to show that, if the
preference parameter of country A increases in period t, the growth rate of the capital
stock per worker (and hence of the income per worker) between the generations t and
t+1 increases, ceteris paribus, in both countries along their transition path to the steady
state. If the economies are already at their steady state in period t, then Equations (17)
and (18) show that a higher βA implies a higher level of capital stock per worker in both
countries.
5 Global Imbalances and Welfare Analysis
The previous section showed that a higher βA imposed by country A’s government yields
a higher transition income growth rate or a higher steady-state income per worker in both
countries. It now remains to find how the welfare of the young and the old generations is
modified when βA is increased in the short and the long run. Without loss of generality,
we will assume that the population growth rates are equal across countries.
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5.1 Short-Run Welfare Analysis
Short-run welfare analysis refers to the first two periods of the economy. Two changes
may occur during this timespan: the integration of the capital markets and country A’s
government intervention on βA. First, let us assume that the capital markets of both
countries integrate between t = 0 and t = 1.5
Proposition 7 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods, the welfare of the old generations of both countries born at t = −1 is unaffected by the
international capital integration, while the young generation born at t = 0 of the country
with the higher (lower) psychological discount factor is raised (reduced).
Proof: See Buiter (1981).
The result is obvious for the old generations as their welfare is determined by the past
capital stock per worker. For the young generations, the result depends on the effect
on the interest rate of the integration of capital markets. Since the capital stock per
worker is higher in the country with the higher psychological discount factor, its interest
rate is lower than in the foreign country, and therefore increases when capital markets
are integrated. An increase in the interest rate has no effect on the saving decision of
the young agents, as their preferences are logarithmic, but it does raise the level of their
utility. The opposite is true for the country with the lower psychological discount factor.
In that country, the integration of capital markets results in a decrease in the interest
rate and yields a lower level of utility for the young generation.
Second, when capital is free to move from one country to another, country A’s government
imposes an increase in βA whenever it is required to avoid a current account deficit. The
welfare effect of this intervention is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods and with integrated capital markets, the welfare of the old generation of both countries
born at t = −1 is unaffected by the increase in βA imposed by country A’s government.
In contrast, the welfare effect on the young generation born at t = 0 in both countries is
negative.
Proof: As previously, the welfare of the old generations is determined by the past capital
stock per worker and is not affected by a change in βA. For the young generations, the
proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 considers the welfare effect on the young and the old generations when the
economy moves from autarky to open economy between t = 0 and t = 1. Proposition 8
compares the welfare of the young and the old generations in an open economy without
5We assume that the owners of capital at t = 0 cannot move this capital from country to country.
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government intervention and in an open economy with government intervention. The
result is unambiguous: the welfare of the old generations in both countries is unchanged,
while the young generations in both countries are worse off. Before analysing the welfare
effect of country A’s government intervention in the long run, it would be interesting to
study the welfare effect on the young and the old generations when the economy moves
from autarky to open economy with government intervention between t = 0 and t = 1.
Proposition 9 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods, the welfare of the old generations born at t = −1 is unaffected as the economy moves
from autarky to an open economy with country A’s government intervention. In contrast,
the effect on the welfare of the young generation born at t = 0 in country A is negative
while it is ambiguous for country B.
Proof: Proof for Proposition 9 can be easily derived from Propositions 7 and 8.
If we consider that the integration of capital markets and the government intervention of
one country occur in the same period (between t = 0 and t = 1), then the welfare effect
on the young and old generations that has to be considered relates to Proposition 9.
5.2 Long-Run Welfare Analysis
Long-run welfare analysis refers to the steady state. Buiter (1981) analyses the case of
an economy moving from autarky to integrated capital markets. In this section, we study
the welfare effect on the young and old generations in an open two-country economy, in
which country A’s government has to intervene at the steady state (case 9) in order to
avoid current account deficits. In the standard OLG model, the maximum of welfare is
attained when the competitive equilibrium coincides with the golden rule. Whereas this
remains true for country B in our model, in country A, the welfare gain from moving
closer to the golden rule may be offset by the welfare loss resulting from the modification
of the intertemporal consumption allocation imposed by country A’s government increase
in βA.
Proposition 10 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods and with integrated capital markets, country A’s government intervention may result
in an increase in the welfare of country B’s young and old generations at the steady
state if and only if the market outcome without government intervention leads to capital
under-accumulation. Otherwise, the welfare is unambiguously decreased.
Proof: Country A’s government intervention always results in a higher steady-state
capital stock per worker in both countries. As a result, it can only be closer to the golden
rule capital stock per worker in country B if the economy experiences under-accumulation
of capital without government intervention. If the capital stock per worker is initially
higher than the golden rule, it can only move away from the optimum.
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Proposition 11 The results of Proposition 10 remain true for country A. However,
country A’s generations undergo a specific welfare loss due to the imposed different in-
tertemporal allocation of consumption. As a consequence, even an outcome closer to the
golden rule can coincide with a lower level of welfare.
Proof: See the proof for Proposition 10. In addition, we can show that for a given
level of capital stock per capita (k˜), any change in the intertemporal consumption alloca-
tion results in a decreased welfare level. The intertemporal utility of the representative














where βA is the discount factor of the representative consumer and βC is the discount
factor imposed by the government. Since the utility function is concave, we know that
utility attains a maximum under the budget constraint whenever βC = βA. If βC 6= βA,
then utility is lower. Hence, for a given capital stock per worker, if the imposed discount
factor, βC , is higher than the representative consumer’s preference parameter, βA, the
welfare of the generations of country A is decreased.
6 Conclusion
Since the end of the 1990s, the world economy has been characterized by large global
imbalances, i.e. a situation in which the fast-growing economies finance the current ac-
count deficits of the advanced economies. The purpose of this paper is to build a growth
model to study the equilibrium conditions for global imbalances to occur and to examine
the welfare implications for the young and old generations in both countries. We extend
the two-country overlapping-generations model of Buiter (1981) to analyse the “global
saving glut” hypothesis Bernanke (2005) in a growth framework. A number of results
are obtained. Propositions 1 to 3 derive the conditions for steady-state current account
deficits (surplus) when two economies differ in their tastes, in their population growth
rates, or both. Proposition 4 gives the condition for an intertemporal equilibrium with
global imbalances to exist. Proposition 5 shows that a government’s intervention in the
fast-growing economy to avoid current account deficits implies a decrease in the world
interest rate, while its effect on the transition growth rate and on the steady-state level
of capital is positive (Proposition 6). Propositions 7 to 9 analyse the welfare effect of
both the integration of capital markets and the government’s intervention in the fast-
growing country on the young and the old generations. While this effect is null for the old
generations in both countries, it is negative for the young generation of the fast-growing
economy and is ambiguous for the young generation of the slow-growing economy.
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In the long run, the effect of the government’s intervention in the fast-growing country on
the welfare of the young and the old generations in the slow-growing country is positive
if there is under-accumulation of capital and is negative otherwise (Proposition 10). The
welfare effect on the young and the old generations of the fast-growing country is more
complicated as the government of this country modifies their choice of intertemporal
allocation of income. Proposition 11 shows that this welfare effect is negative. Overall,
the decision of the government of the fast-growing economy to modify the propensity of
its domestic residents to save has no impact on the old generation in the short run but it
does decrease the welfare of all other generations in the short and long run.
This deterministic framework with perfect capital markets can be extended in a number
of ways. For instance, the model is flexible enough to add capital market imperfections
in order to study the relationship between global imbalances and imperfections in the
capital markets in slow-growing economies. Another interesting line of research would be
the possibility for the generations of the slow-growing economies to postpone the interest
payments from period to period. Finally, a framework with uncertainty could allow for
the analysis of possible disruptive adjustments in the balance of payments.
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7 Appendix
To prove that the welfare effect of country A’s government intervention on country A’s
young generation born at t = 0 is negative (Proposition 8), it suffices to study the differ-
ence between the utility U0 of the young generation resulting from the market outcome,
and the utility UC0 resulting from any other imposed psychological discount factor βC ,
ceteris paribus. This difference can be expressed as:







































where D(βC) is the difference between the utilities of the young generation without and
with government intervention, and kC,1 the per capita stock of capital in country A at
t = 1 under the optimization based on βC instead of βA.



























































































If βC = βA, then D(βC) = 0. Whenever it is required, country A’s government interven-
tion results in a higher preference parameter than that of the representative consumer.
Therefore, we merley have to compute the first derivative of D(βC) with respect to βC




















If βC > βA, Equation (37) is positive. Therefore, the utility of country A’s young genera-
tion born at t = 0 diminishes when its government has to intervene (cases 7, 8 and 9) in
order to avoid a current account deficit. We can conclude that the welfare of country A’s
young generation is lower in an open economy with countryA’s government intervention
than in an open economy without government intervention.
Let us now turn to the welfare effect of country A’s government intervention on country
B’s young generation born at t = 0. Proposition 8 states that the welfare effect is also
negative. The welfare of country B’s young generation born at t = 0 is only affected
through the modification of the world interest rate at t = 1. The saving decision of this
young generation is unaffected by the modification of βA but its consumption in the next
period is influenced by the world interest rate at t = 1. An increase in βA results in more
saving in country A leading to a lower world interest rate at t = 1. This lower interest
rate decreases the consumption of country B’s young generation (born at t = 0) at t = 1
while leaving unchanged its consumption level at t = 0 due to the logarithmic form of the
utility function. In total, the welfare of this young generation decreases. Consequently,
any increase in βA results in a decrease in the welfare of the young generation at t = 0 in
country B.
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